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NO REQUIEM FOR THE RESTRAINT DOCTRINE -  YET
Pearson Nherere*
1. INTRODUCTION
The decision of the Zimbabwean Supreme Court in the ease of Book v 
Davidson* 1 (hereinafter referred to as the Book ease) like the notorious Scottish 
case of the snail in the ginger beer bottle,2 is one of those eases which every 
student going through a course on the Law of Contract just must know. Not 
because it had anything to do with a dubious snail attaining jurisprudential 
immortal ily by virtue of exhibiting an anthropomorphic propensity for alcoholic 
beverages. No. The facts of Book's ease arc quite unremarkable in fact. It is to 
be remembered because it (is supposed to have) changed the law. Before the 
decision in ihcBook ease, Zimbabwean law on covenants in restraint of trade was 
one tiling. After it, it is quite another — or is it?
One thing which is quite clear, even in the wake of the Book ease, is that the 
restraint doctrine is still part of our law. It may not be as easy as it used to be to 
state what the restraint of trade doclrinb says, but, be lhat.as it may, the gist of 
the doctrine can, it is submitted, still be formulated without much trepidation. It 
is the rulelhatcontractual provisions which purport to. reslrictapcrson’s.frccdom 
to trade and/or work where and when she/he chooses with whomsoever she/he 
pleases, generally known as covenants in restraint of,trade, arc a class apart from 
other contractual terms. They arc a category of contractual stipulations the 
enforceability of which is not dependent on consensus alone.3 *
It is open to a parly to a restraint clause to challenge its enforcement on the 
grounds of unreasonableness. As regards contracts in general, once it is estab­
lished that a term was freely and voluntarily agreed upon it is enforceable 
regardless of how unfair, harsh or unreasonable it might be. The cognate 
doctrines of freedom and sanctity of contract dictate that as the parlies make their 
contract, so must they abide by it. But not so with covenants in restraint of trade.
Basically, it could be said that the law relating to covenants in restraint of 
trade has been changed by the Book ease in four respects, namely:
1. the very formulation of the restraint doctrine itself;
* Lecturer, Department of Public Law, Faculty of Law, University of Zimbabwe
1 Unreported judgment No. SC/67/88. Reference herein will be to the cyclostylcd judgment.
2 Danoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562.
3 Such vitiating elements as.fraud, misrepresentation, duress, undue influence, mistake and
lack of capacity arc, for the purpose of this submission, regarded as going to the sufficiency 
of consent. Illegal contracts, of which covenants in restraint of trade can be said to be a sub­
species, stand on a different fooling. It should be noted that illegal contracts are 
unenforceable simply because they are illegal. Their reasonableness or unreasonableness 
is quite beside the point.
2 N herere , N o  R e q u ie th fo r  the R estra in t D octr ine
2. the question as to whether the onus of proof is oh the 
covenantee or the covenantor to prove the reasonableness or 
unreasonableness (as the case may be) of a restraint;
3. the relevant date for assessing the reasonableness (or 
unreasonableness) of a restraint and
4. the standard, if any, to be applied in determining when a 
court may sever the unacceptable bits of a restraint clause so
as to leave the acceptable ones which would then be
enforceable.
In this article, it will be argued that —
1. on the facts of the case, the Book case was far from being the 
. most satisfactory of decisions;
2. while there is no inconsistency between the conclusions 
arrived at and the reasons given for them, the reasons given 
as the basis for changing the law did not ineluctably lead to 
the conclusions reached. In short, the arguments were not as 
compelling as the Court seemed to assume;
3. inadequate analysis was given to the South African deci­
sions which the court followed, the Zimbabwean cases 
which the court overruled, and the so-called English 
approach which the court rejected;
4. in the light of the court’s own reasoning, there was really no 
need to depart from what had, hitherto been understood to be 
Zimbabwean law and that
5. once the court had been so bold as to venture into the realms 
of judicial law-creation, it should have gone further than the 
South African courts and jettisoned the restraint doctrine 
altogether. The iaw as it is, without the restraint of trade 
doctrine, would be quite adequate to cater for the more 
excessive and objectionable versions of restrictive covenants 
or alternatively, that the court should have substituted a 
general unconscionability doctrine for the narrower rules 
governing covenants in restraint of trade.
2. THE LAW THAT WAS
Zimbabwean law as it was understood to be before theBook case (hereinafter 
referred to as the orthodox approach) was the same as English Law.4 South *&
For detailed discussion of English Law on the point, see Hcydon, The Restraint of Trade 
Doctrine Bullerworths, London (1971); Treilcl, The Law of Contract (6lh Ed.), Stevens
& Sons, London, 1983, pp.341-353; Cheshire, Fifoot and Furmslon, The Law of Contract, 
(10th Ed.), Bullerworths, London (1981), pp.351-370.
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African law too was the same5 67until 1984.6 Consequently, a discussion of the 
shaping and development of the modern English Law on restraint of trade could, 
by and large, be said to be a discussion of the development of the Zimbabwean 
orthodox approach.
The starting point for the modem English law on the subject is the decision 
of the House of Lords in the case oT Nordenfell v Maxim Nordenfelt Guns and 
Ammunition Co? In an often-quoted passage from Lord McNaughten’s speech, 
the law was enunciated thus:
“The true view at the present time, I think, is this. The public 
have an interest in every person’s carrying on his trade freely. All 
interference with individual liberty of action in trading, and all 
restraints of trade of themselves if there is nothing more, are 
contrary to public policy and therefore void. But there are 
exceptions. Restraint of trade and interference with individual 
liberty of action may be justified by the special circumstances of 
a particular case. It is sufficient justification, and indeed it is the 
only justification that the restraint is reasonable — that is in 
reference to the interests of the parties concerned, and reasonable 
in reference to the interests of the public; so-framed and so- 
guarded as to afford adequate protection to the party in whose 
favour it is imposed, while at the same time it is in no way 
injurious to the public.”8 9
For close on two centuries, before thc Nordenfelt case, the leading authority 
on the enforceability of covenants in restraint of trade had been the judgment of 
Lord Macclesfield in Mitchel vReynolds? This decision had been understood as 
having drawn a distinction between general restraints on the one hand, and partial
5 See generally Christie, The Law of Contract in South Africa, Buttcrwonhs, Durban, 
(1982), pp.352-368; Kerr, Principles of the Law of Contract in South Africa (3rd Ed.), 
Butterworlhs, Durban (1980), pp. 109—131. Also see Gordon v Van Blerk 1927 TPD 770, 
Durban Rickshas Ltd. v Ball 1933 NPD 479 and New United Yeast Distributors (Ply) Ltd. 
v Brooks 1935 WLD 75. Li Van De Pol v Silvermann and Another 1952 (2) SA 561 (A), 
the South African Appellate Division assumed, without decision, that the English rules of 
restraint of trade were applicable in South Africa.
6 The decision of the Appellate Division in Magna Alloys and Research (Pty) Ltd. v. Ellis 
1984 (4) SA 874 (A) pul the South African law beyond doubt. Rojfey v Catlerall, Edwards 
and Goudre 1977 (4) SA 494 (N) had caused some confusion by departing from the 
orthodox English approach in favour of what Didcoll J. regarded as the Roman-Dutch 
approach. Between 1977 and 1984 there was confusion as the different provincial 
divisions went their separate ways. See, for instance. Highlands Park Eootball Club Ltd. 
v Viljoen 1978 (3) SA 191 (W); Stewart Wrightson (Pty) Ltd. vMinnilt 1979 (3) SA 399 
(C), Madoo (Pty)Ltd.v Wallace 1979 (2)SA 957 (J),NationalChemsearch S A. (Pty) Ltd. 
v Borrowman and Another 1979 (3) SA 1092 (T), and Drewttens (Pty) Ltd. vCarley 1981 
(4) SA 305.
7 (1984) AC 535 (11L).
8 (Supra), at p.565.
9 (1711) IP WMS 181.
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restraints on the other. General restraints were automatically void, while partial 
restraints were, by their very nature, valid and enforceable. The Nordenfelt case 
did away with this dichotomy! As far as Lord McNaughlen was concerned,
“All interference with individual liberty of action . . .  and of trade 
arc prima facie void.” (Emphasis added).
This formulation did away with the distinction between general and partial 
restraints. A covenant in restraint of trade was a covenant in restraint of trade and 
that was that. Its enforceability or otherwise depended on the reasonableness test.
The law as laid down in the Nordenfelt casewas applied by the House of 
Lords in Mason v Provident Clothing and Supply Co10 and in Herbert Morris 
Ltd. v Saxelbyn The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council also followed the 
Nordenfelt case in Attorney-General of the Commonwealth o f Australia v. 
Adelaide Steamship Co. Ltd11 In Herbert Morris Ltd. v Sdxelby, Lord Parker, 
having observed that it is against public policy to enforce covenants in restraint 
of trade unless there arc special circumstances to justify such restraints, went on 
to say: '
“The onus of proving such special circumstances must, of course, rest on the 
party alleging them.”13,
Thus, the rule was established that \hcorfiis of proving the reasonableness of 
a restraint lies on the person seeking to enforce it almost always the covenantee, 
in whose favour it is imposed.14 15
For thccovcnantce to discharge the onus on him/her to prove reasonableness, 
hc/shc had to establish that hc/shc had a legitimate interest to protect, and that the 
restraint clause was no more than adequate foLIhc protection of that legitimate 
interest. Whqrc the restraint formed part of a contract for the sale of a business, 
the good-will of the business purchased sufficed to constitute the legitimate 
proprietary interest for the protection of which a restrictive covenant could 
justifiably be imposed. As regards cmploycr/cmployec relations, an employer 
could justifiably impose a restraint wt?,crc hc/shc .had trade secrets, trade 
connections or cuslomcrs/clicnlclc to protect.13
As has already been pointed out, these rules were adopted by our courts, and 
formed part of Zimbabwean law. In Spa Food Products and Another v Sarif16
10 (1913) AC 72-1 (III.).
11 (1916) 1 AC 688 (HI.).
• 12 (1913) AC 781 (PC).
13 (1916)1 AC 688 at 707.
14 Van de Pol v Silvermann and Another (supra) is an unusual case in that there, it was the 
covenantee who was arguing that the covenanl in restraint of trade was unreasonable, and 
therefore unenforceable.
15 Sec Herbert Morris Ltd. v Saxdby (1916) 1 AC 688 (III.) al 710.
16 1951 SR 279, 1952 (1)SA 713 (SR).
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Beadle J. (as he then was) applied English law without any qualification. In fact, 
both counsel had cited English and South African authorities without, so it would 
seem, according to South African ones any greater weight.17 In 11. JL. Sergay 
Estates (Pvt) Ltd. v Romano, Goldin J. said:18
' “All covenants in restraint of trade are prima facie - invalid and 
unenforceable unless the person seeking to enforce such a 
covenant proves, the onus is on the applicant, that the restraint is 
reasonable in the interests of both parties, not contrary to public 
policy and affords adequate protection, and no more than 
adequate protection of some proprietary interest owned by the 
applicant.”
This was the approach taken by the General Division of the High Court of 
Rhodcsia in Rhodesian Milling Co. (Pvt) Ltd. v Super Bakery (Pvt) Ltd.'9 and 
Biografic (Pvt) Ltd. v Wilson.20 The Zimbabwean Supreme Court followed suit 
in Davies and Others v National Foods of Zimbabwe Limited.21-22 23
The nature of the reasonableness test necessarily gave rise to the question as 
to the relevant date of assessing the reasonableness of a restraint. Would the 
reasonableness of a clause have to be tested by reference to the facts as they 
obtained at the time of the conclusion of the contract (the inception dale rule), or 
by reference to the facts as they existed at the time the court was called upon to 
enforce therestraint? If the alternatives are couched in termsof the restraintbeing 
either valid or invalid, the obvious solution that suggests itself is that the 
reasonableness is to be assessed as at the date of the conclusion of the contract.
. A contract is either valid or invalid ab initio. The inception-date rule must, 
therefore, be the applicable rule. This was the position in England, South Africa 
23 and Zimbabwe until the Book case. As Price J put it:24
“if the validity of the restraint clause had to be tested by reference 
to the facts on any date other than the date when the agreement 
was made, the question of such validity would always remain 
uncertain. Events might interpose between the date of the 
contract and the date of the hearing of a case some of which 
might make a restraint clause invalid which was originally valid
17 At p.714 of SA LR.
18 1967 (3) SA1 at 2.
19 1973 (2) RLR 145, 1973 (4) SA 436 (R).
20 1 974 (1) RLR 38, 1974 (2) SA 342 (R).
21 Unrcportcd judgment No. S.C.150/87.
22 In Commercial dt Industrial Holdings (Pvt) Ltd. and Another v Leigh-Smith 1982 (1) ZLR 
246, 1982 (4) SA (226) the Zimbabwean Supreme Court expressly left open the question 
whether the onus is on the covenantee to prove unreasonableness or on the covenantor to 
prove reasonableness.
23 In the South African case of Aling and Streak v Olivier (1949) (1) SA 215 (T). Price J. 
relying on English authorities, held that the inception-dale rale was the one applicable in 
South Africa.
24 Aling and Streak v Olivier (supra) at pp.219-220.
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and then other events might occur to make that clause valid 
again. If the validity of the clause had to be determined by events . 
which had occurred after the date when the contract was entered 
into, the enquiry would become arbitrary and artificial. The 
clause is valid or invalid ab initio and therefore the only facts that 
are relevant are the facts at the moment the contract is signed.”25 2678
In Gledhow Autoparts Ltd. v Delaney 26 Diplock LJ (as he then was) 
expressed himself in these terms:
It is natural in those circumstances to tend to look at what in fact 
happened under the agreement. But the question of the validity of 
a covenant in restraint of trade has to be determined at the date 
the agreement is entered into.”
In Pest Control (Central Africa) Ltd. v Martin and Anotherf1 Trcdgold CJ 
took it as trite law that:
“The final test must be whether the covenant was reasonable 
when it was made.”
a
The Zimbabwean Supreme Court maintained this position in Commercial 
and Industrial Holdings and Others (Pvt) Ltd. v Leigh-Smilh and Others™ a 
stance taken against the background of South African Provincial Division 
decision in which it had been held that the date of the hearing of the case, and not 
the inception date, was the relevant date for determining the reasonableness of 
a restraint. The court had been urged to follow these decisions —  hence the 
following remark by Georges JA (as he then was):
/.
“The view expressed by Price J. in Aling and Streak v Olivier 
(1949) (1) SA 216 (T) commends itself as soundly stated. I am 
not convinced, however, that the existing law is so plainly wrong
in logic or in good sense that any radical departure is required.”29
' ^
As regards the issue of severability, English Law, as enunciated in Attwood 
v Lamont,30 accurately reflected Zimbabwean Law. In Attwood v Lamont, Lord 
Stcmdalc MR approved of, and applied, the “blue-pencil” test,31 adding that a 
covenant was severable only if it was, in effect, not a single covenant but several 
with the result that severance could be effected without changing the meaning 
and object which the parties themselves intended. Younger LJ put the same view 
thus:
25 Also see Allied Electric (Ply) Ltd. v Meyer and Another 1979 (4) SA 325 (W).
26 (1965) 3 All ER 288 (CA) at 295, (1965) 1 WLR 1366 (CA) at 1377.
27 1955 (3) SA 609 (SR) at 613.
28 1 982 (1) ZLR 247, 1982 (4) SA 226.
29 1982 (4) SA 226 at 234.
30 (1920)3 KB 571 (CA).
At 578.31
I.. Where the covenant is not really a single covenant but is in 
effect a combination of several distinct covenants and where 
severance can be carried out without the addition or alteration of 
a word it is permissible. But in that case only.”32
This reluctance to temper with the parties’ contract is in accordance with the 
Victorian strict constructionist approach to contracts. Any additions or altera­
tions, so the argument goes, would be tantamount to making a contract for the 
parties. In the case of Carthew-Gabriel v Fox and Carney (Pvt) Ltd. 33 345 the 
Rhodesian Appellate Division would not enforce, in respect of the Greater 
Salisbury area only, a clause which purported to restrain an cx-cmploycc from 
being employed in, carrying on a business, or having an interest in a business “in 
any way similar to the one of the company . . .  within any area of Rhodesia in 
which the company is carrying on its business.” It was clear that the Respondent 
Estate Agents carried on business in the Greater Salisbury area, that the 
Appellant had been employed in an office in the then Salisbury area, and that had 
the covenant been limited to the Greater Salisbury area, it would have been 
enforceable. But, as phrased, the restraint was too wide. There could be no 
severance without the addition or alteration of a word. Accordingly, there could 
be no severance. The court could not narrow down the clause for the parties. To 
do so would have been making a new contract for them. Such an exercise would 
not have been consonant with the rules as enunciated in Aiiwood v Lamont.M
This was the orthodox approach to covenants in restraint of trade.
In 1977, in the case of Roffey v Calleral, Edwards and Goudre (Ply) Ltd?5 
Didcott J. (Friedman A.J. concurring) madca decision which, while falling quite 
short of a dint of “Dcnningcsquc” boldness, was to have quite some effect.36 The
Z. L. Rev. Vol. 6 19S8  1
32 At 593.
33 1978 (1)SA 598 (RA).
34 (Supra).
35 (Supra).
36 The English origins and non-Roman-Dutch character of the restraint doctrine had been 
commented upon before. Similarly, tbc propriety of slavishly following English law had 
also been questioned. Sec, Edgecombe v Hodgson 1902 (19) S.C. 224, 226, where Dc 
Villicrs CJ said: “The question has never been pointedly raised whether and to what extent 
the English doctrine relating to restraints of trade is applicable in this colony.” In Katz v 
Efthymiou (1948) (4) SA 603 (O) Dc Beer AJP had this to say at 610: “The nilc that 
contracts in restraint of trade arc generally to be considered as being in conflict with public 
policy is entirely foreign lo lhc Roman and Roman-Dutch systems of law .. .  . However, 
the doctrine has been ingrafted into our law and the only further difficulties which may 
arise arc whether the doctrine is, in its entirety, to be applied by our courts even when 
certain branches arc based bn local considerations which do not prevail with us and 
whether our courts may in turn depart from the rigid application when considerations 
peculiar to South Africa present themselves.” In Van de Pot v Silverman and Another 
(1952) (2) SA 561 (A), Greenberg JA said: at p.569. “The first defence rests on the 
contention that an agreement in restraint of trade is prima facie unenforceable. We were 
informed that counsel on both sides had not been able to find anything in Roman-Dutch
law which prohibited or viewed with disfavour such agreements__ As far as I know, there
has been no decision in this court on the point. . .” Also see SA. Wire Co. (Pty) Ltd. v 
Durban Wire and Plastics 1968 (2) S A 777 (D); Diner v Carpet Manufacturing Co. of S A.
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learned Judge categorically rejected the English Law of restraint of trade. In its 
place, he substituted a South African version of the restraint of trade doctrine. 
This culminated in the decision of the South African Appellate Division decision 
in Magna Alloys and Research (Pty) Ltd. v Ellis.31 By and large, the Appellate 
Division endorsed the approach of Didcott J. In turn, Magna Alloys andRescarch 
(Pty) Ltd. v Ellis led to the decision in the Book case.
3. T IIE  FACTS OF THE BOOK CASE
The Appellant (Book) had in 1983, purchased from one St. Claire Monro- 
Horn, the business of rc-cnamclling, polishing and restoring baths, which 
business was carried on under thcnamcand stylcof Rcspo-Tcchnik (Zimbabwe) 
Ltd. The said business was transferred to Appellant on the 1st of July 1983.
Soon thereafter, the Appellant found himself in financial difficulties. As a 
result thereof, Appellant sold to Respondent (Davidson) a half-share in the 
business. The parlies (Appellant and Respondent) thereupon entered into a 
partnership the object of which was to:
“Continue and carry on the business presently carried on by Book 
under the name or style of Respo-Technik (Zimbabwe) in all its 
facets, but, particularly, as a re-enamcllcr and restorer of baths.”
Apparently, Appellant’s financial difficulties did not go away. The partner­
ship was dissolved on 24th May 1984 when the Appellant sold his half-share in 
the business to the Respondent.
Sometime in 1986, it came to Respondent’s notice that the Appellant had 
entered into»a partnership with one Larkins. The business of this partnership, 
trading as the Bath Doctor, was the re-enamelling, polishing and restoring of 
baths.
The Respondent (Applicant in the Court a quo) sought an interdict in the 
High Court restraining Appellant from breaching the terms of the covenant in 
restraint of trade contained in their partnership agreement. He also sought an 
order directing Book to make available to him all his books of account and other 
records relating to the conduct of his business (The Bath Doctor) to enable him 
to assess the damages he had been occasioned by the breach.
It is important to note that the restraint clause that Respondent was relying 
upon was contained in the memorandum of partnership of September 1983, and 
not the sale agreement of May 24, 1984.* 378 The covenant in question was
*
Ltd. 1969 (2) SA 101 (D) at 103; Arthur Suzman, "The Contribution of English Law to
South African Law, and the rule of law.” 1968 (85) SAU  90, at 91; and Kahn, “The Rules
Relating to Contracts in Restraint of Trade Whence and Whither" 1968 (86) SAU  391.
Besides, Didcott J. did not have to fly in the face of an Appellate Division decision.
37 (Supra).-
38 This point is not addressed by the Supreme Court.
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contained in clause 12 of the memorandum of partnership which read in the 
pertinent part:
“Furthermore, neither partner shall, within three years from the . 
termination of the partnership, and within the Magisterial 
province of Mashonaland, operate or engage in, or be interested 
in, whether directly or indirectly, any business or occupation 
involving the re-enamelling or restoring of baths or any other 
business carried out by the partnership.”
In the High Court, the “restraint of trade” point was not Appellant’s main line 
of attack. Instead, he argued that when he signed the memorandum of partner­
ship, he was under the impression that the restraint was for a two-year period and 
not three. He had assumed, so it was contended, that the restraint provision in the 
memorandum of partnership was identical to the one contained in clause 9 of the 
agreement of sale between him and St. Claire Monro-Horn. In terms of that 
Clause 9, the seller of the business (St. Claire Monro-Horn) had been restrained 
from competing with the purchaser for a period of two years. Appellant was thus 
pleading mistake. He sought rectification of Clause 12 of the memorandum of 
partnership so that the clause would read: “. . .within two years from the 
termination . . . ” Had the prayer for rectification succeeded, Appellant would 
then not have been in breach as the two year period from May 24 1984 had 
expired. Unfortunately for him, the prayer failed.
The submission that the restraint provision was unreasonably wide was made 
in the alternative. It was dealt with, as it were, in passing in Appellant’s 
answering affidavit. It would seem that Manyarara J. (as he then was) did not give 
it much attention cither.39 It too failed. The Appellant appealed.
On appeal, the rectification point was abandoned. It was thought that it had 
no chance of succeeding. The reasonableness of the restraint was the only point 
in issue. For the Appellant, it was submitted on the basis of the orthodox 
approach, that the onus was on the Respondent, qua covenantee to establish the 
reasonableness of the restraint, to prove that ip went no further than was 
reasonably necessary to protect the Respondent’s legitimate proprietary inter­
ests. It was also contended, in the alternative, that even if it were to beheld that 
the onus was on the Appellant to prove that the covenant was unreasonable, 
Clause 12 of the memorandum of partnership was clearly unreasonable. Respon­
dent’s counsel urged the Court to reject the orthodox English position and adopt 
the new South African “Roman-Dutch” approach. This argument carried the 
day. The South African decisions were followed.
4. THE QUESTION OF ONUS
The new Zimbabwean law, according to thcBook case, is that the onus is now
39 See unreported judgment No. IIC-11.476/86.
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on the party resisting the enforcement of a covenant in restraint of trade to show 
that the restraint is unreasonable, and, therefore, unenforceable. The onus of 
proof has thus been shifted from the covenantee to the covenantor. The learned 
Chief Justice said: (at pp.18-19)
“The acceptance of public policy as the criterion means that when 
a party alleges that he is not bound by a restrictive condition to 
which he has agreed, he bears the onus of proving that the 
enforcement of the condition would be contrary to public policy.”
He went on to say: (at p.20)
I am more titan persuaded that it makes good common sense to 
place the onus of proof on the party that wishes to renege the 
contract (sic). Why should the onus not be on the person oppos­
ing the enforcement of the restraint? He must show why the 
restraint provision is unenforceable. He must tell the court why 
he says the restraint is unreasonable. I can see no good reason 
why it should not fall upon him to prove what he alleges is 
against his and/or the public interest.”
As there was a long line of authorities40 placing the onus of proof oh the 
covenantee, it is submitted that the issue before the Supreme Court was not “Why 
should the onus not be on the covenantor” as the learned Chief Justice seems to 
suggest. On the contrary, the court had to be convinced that what had been held 
to be the law all along was clearly wrong. The decision in the Book case is a 
momentous one by any standards. It is one that should not have been made 
without compelling reasons. Yet, on looking for the compelling reasons on the 
strength of which the Supreme Court changed the law, they are not easy to find 
—  if for no other reason than that the court itself did not take the trouble to 
articulate them with crystalline clarity.
In the above-quoted passage, it is said:
“The acceptance of public policy as the priterion means that when 
a party alleges that he is not bound by a restrictive condition to 
which he had agreed, he bears the onus of proving that the 
enforcement of the condition would be contrary to public policy.” 
(Emphasis added).
Of course, it would be presumptuous to be categorical about what the word 
“means" is meant to denote in this remark. If, as appears to be the case, what the
40 See Footnotes 16-20 above. In Commercial and Industrial Holdings (Pvt) Lid. and 
Another v Leigh-Smith and Others (supra), the question of onus was left open by the 
Zimbabwean Supreme Court. At p.231 of the S.A. Law Report Georges JA remarked that: 
“In Zimbabwe, as the learned judge a quo correctly pointed out, the decided cases have all 
held that the onus lies on the party seeking to enforce a covenant in restraint of trade to show 
that it is reasonable. There has, however, been no decision at Appellate level.”
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court meant is flint the acceptance of public policy as the determining standard 
inevitably leads to, or dictates, the placing of the onus on the covenantor, it is 
most respectfully submitted that this line of reasoning is far from compelling. 
The mere fact that public policy is the criterion does not necessarily determine 
the issue of onus one way or the other. What is more important is what it is, 
exactly, that has to beproved. In any. event, there was no question of “accepting”, 
(for the first time as it were), public policy as the criterion in the Book case, or 
the Magna Alloys case for that matter. Public policy has, for a very long time 
indeed, been understood to be the basis of the rules relating to covenants in 
restraint of trade. As Lord McNaughten put it;41 “All restraints of trade of 
themselves, if there is nothing more arc contrary to public policy and therefore 
void.”42 Yet, the onus of proving the reasonableness of a restraint has always 
been on the covenantor.
What makes the difference is not so much the mere fact that public policy is 
the criterion, but the precise formulation of the policy-based rule. The orthodox 
view is that once a contractual provision has been categorized as a covenant in 
restraint of trade, it is against public policy and therefore invalid unless it is 
shown to be reasonable. In line with the general principle that he who avers must 
prove, the covenantor need notdoanylhing in the first instanceapartfrom merely 
showing that the contractual provision in question is indeed a covenant in 
restraint of trade. It would then be up to the covenantee to aver, and prove, that 
even though the clause in question is a restraint clause, it is, nonetheless, 
reasonable.43 On the other hand the formulation could be that a restraint provision 
is valid and enforceable unless it is unreasonable on the grounds of public policy.
\
If this is the preferred formulation, then, assuming that the covenantee can 
show that there was consensus ad idem (otherwise the restraint doctrine would 
not be an issue), the onus would then be on thecovenantor to establish unreasona­
bleness.44
But, in both instances, public policy is the criterion. It is the basis upon which 
covenants in restraint of trade are put into a category of their own, apart from
! Z. L. Rev. Vol. 6 1 9 8 8
41 Nordenfell v Maxim Nordenfell Guns and Ammunition Co. (1894) AC 535.
42 At 565.
43 The onus on the covenantor envisaged in this context is to show that a restrictive condi­
tion is one which docs not only limit an individual’s liberty to trade, but, also in restraint 
of tradc.in the sense of the doctrine (as opposed to the purely grammatical sense). While 
every covenant in restraint of trade involves a derogation from freedom to trade, not every 
derogation from freedom of trade is a covenant in restraint of trade. See Esso Petroleum 
Co. Ltd. v Harper's Garage (Stourport) Ltd. 1968 AC 269 (HL) (1967) 1 ALL' ER 699 
(HL) (1967)2 WLR 871, cited with approval in Rhodesian Milling Co. (Pvt) Ltd. v Super 
Bakery (Pvt) Ltd. (supra). Also sec A. Schroeder Music Publishing Co. v Macaulay (1974) 
3 ALL ER 616 (HL).
44 Even if the latter formulation is adopted, it does not necessarily follow that the onus of 
proof should be on the covenantor. It is not unheard of for the general rule that he who avers 
must prove to be departed from. For instance, in seduction cases, it is implicit in the 
woman’s suit that she was a virgin at the material time. Yet, the onus is on the male alleged 
seducer to establish.that she was not a virgin. Sec Bull v Taylor (1965) (4) SA 29 (A).
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other contractual terms the enforceability of which may not be challenged on the 
grounds of reasonableness or unreasonableness. As for the weight of “good 
commonscnse” as a reason for changing the law, it is submitted that in this 
context at least, the “good commonscnse” should take into account the crucial. 
question as to why our law should have a doctrine of restraint at all. Once the 
rationale for the doctrine has been ascertained, it makes lots of good common- 
sense to develop the rules relating to onus of proof in a manner that would best 
advance the policy rationale for the doctrine. Moreover, good commonscnse 
should also take into account the type of evidence that a party would have to 
adduce to discharge the onus resting upon him/her. It is submitted that it would 
not make good commonsensc to expect a party to discharge the onus upon.him/ 
her by establishing a series of negatives.,
The effectof \hcBook case was to bring Zimbabwean lawinto line with South 
African law. Perhaps one of the reasons for the decision was just that— to bring 
Zimbabwean law into line with South African law. That the stance laken by the 
South African courts had a considerable impact on the.dccision in the,Book case 
appears from Dum.butshcna CJ’s observation that:
“As long as the majority of South African Courts continued to 
follow the English approach, the Zimbabwean Courts were in 
good company. I say this because both countries have 
Roman-Dutch law jurisdictions.. . .  this Court cannot, however, 
lightly ignore the decision in Magna Aliys and Research (Pty)
Ltd. v Ellis (supra) because Zimbabwe is still a Roman-Dutch. 
common law country. Decisions of a court in another 
Roman-Dutch law jurisdiction have, in relative cases, very 
persuasive authority.”45
The stress on the “Roman-Dutch” character of the two jurisdictions here is 
rather disconcerting. It would appear that undue weight was given to the 
desirability of Roman-Dutch uniformity. The uniformity of laws between 
Zimbabwe and South. Africa, Roman-Dutch as they both admittedly are, is not 
a virtue in itself. This is even more so in the area of covenants in restraint of trade. 
The restraint of trade doctrine is based on public policy which varies from place 
to place and from time to time. Once it has been accepted that Roman-Dutch law 
holds certain categories of contracts to be invalid and/or unenforceable on the 
grounds of public policy, the issue then becomes what public policy, in 
Zimbabwe, dictates at a given point in time. Thus, in the Book case, because the 
public policy point was obvious, the Roman-Dutch character of South African 
law was a matter of irrelevance. The issue at stake was not the interpretation or 
extrapolation of a text from Voet, Grotius or Van Der Linden. The question 
before the court was what public policy required in 1988 Zimbabwe, in the light 
of the prevalent political, moral and socio-economic conditions.46 In the case of
45 A ip .lt.
46 It is not sought to be argued that the court was unaware of this point. The submission is that 
insufficient weight was given to these factors — in their Zimbabwean context.
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Drewttens (Pty) Ltd. v C arle/7 Van Den Hecvcr J. in rejecting the English 
approach reasoned thus:
A decision in the United Kingdom as to what would detrimentally 
affect the interests of the community is not necessarily valid for a . 
community differently constituted . . .  thousands of kilometres 
away.”
As Dumbutshcna CJ himself put it:
“I think what is required in Zimbabwe is the development of the 
law of restraint which accords with modem times and which is 
more appropriate to the circumstances now prevailing in the 
country.”47 8
Unfortunately, only lip-service seems to have been paid to this precept. Had 
due regard been given thereto, the comparison with South Africa would not have 
been on the basis of the Roman-Dutch character of the jurisdictions, but, on the 
relative economic conditions. If it is accepted that the relevant factors for 
consideration arc the political, moral and socio-economic conditions and policy 
goals of a given community, it follows from that premise that there is no reason 
why Roman-Dutch authorities should be regarded as being any weightier than 
authorities from other jurisdictions. After opining that “the circumstances now 
prevailing in the country” were what the court had to have in mind when 
developing law, Dumbutshena CJ does not, regrettably, proceed to articulate 
what those “circumstances” were. What changes, if any, political, social, eco­
nomic or otherwise had taken place which warranted the change in the law 
brought about by the Supreme Court in the Boo/: case? Ex facie the judgment the 
court did not consider, let alone analyse, any such changes. If the court did take 
such factors into account, it must be assumed that jhey were considered qua 
“inarticulate major premise”. The reasoning in the case would have been more 
convincing had the “prevailing circumstances” precept been better-developed 
and articulated. Otherwise, it is tempting to conclude that the Supreme Court 
took refuge behind that most confounded of weasel-words — public policy and 
vague generalizations on laissez faire and freedom of contract.
Insofar as the decision in the Book case was influenced by the South African 
decisions culminating in the Appellate Division decision in the Magna Alloys 
case, it is necessary to look to those decisions for the rationale behind the new 
approach. With regard to the question of onus, the South African decisions to 
consider are: Roffey v Catteral, Edwards and Goudref9 Drewttens v Carley,50 
and, of course, Magna Alloys and Research S.A. (Ply) Lid. v Ellis.51 In the final
47 1981 (4) SA 305, at 311.
48 At p.14.
49 (Supra).
50 (Supra).
51 (Supra).
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analysis, three reasons are given for shifting the onus from the covenantee to the 
covenantor. They are the Roman-Dutch law argument, sanctity of contract, and, 
the idea that the appeal to public policy yields different results in the South 
African context as opposed to the English context in which the traditional 
restraint doctrine was developed. These reasons will be dealt with seriatim.52
In Roffey v Cattcral, Edwards and Goudre,53 Didcotl J. surveyed the 
historical development of the restraint of trade doctrine in English Law and 
concluded that:
“What originated as a contemporary reaction to specific problems 
in a particular historical selling hardened eventually into a fixed 
rule of law invalidating all covenants in restraint of trade. 
Roman-Dutch law, on the other hand, had no noticeable aversion 
to covenants in restraint of trade”
Ini Drewttens (Ply) Ltd. v Carlcy, Van Den Hccvcr J. took the view that: “The 
doctrine that contracts in restraint of trade arc generally to be considered as being 
in conflict with public policy is entirely foreign to the Roman-Dutch and Roman 
systems of law.”54 The South African Appellate Division was of the same 
opinion in Magna Alloys and Research S.A. (Ply) Ltd. v Ellis55, the hcadnotc of 
which reads in part: The approach followed in many South African judgments 
that a covenant in restraint of trade is primafacie invalid or unenforceable stems 
from English Law, and not our common law.”56 As far as the Roman-Dutch 
authorities arc concerned, the most quoted text in this regard is Vocl 2.14.16,57 58
which reads: “All honourable and possible matters may be made the subject of 
an agreement but not those contrary to public law nor those which might redound 
to the public'injury.” The instances of contracts contrary to public policy given 
by Voct in the subsequent paragraphs do not include covenants in restraint of 
trade. The category of contracts in restraint of trade docs not feature at all, hence 
De Villicrs CJ’s comment in Edgecombe v llodgson5S that: “He (Vocl) does not 
mention the encouragement of trade as a matter of public policy.”59 The
rhe decision in the Book case was foreshadowed by the judgment of Greenland J. in 
Mparadzi v Mangwana (unreported judgment No. IIC.H/637/87), confirmed on appeal in 
Mangwana v Mparadzi (unreported judgment S.C.5/89). In Davit and Others v National 
Foods of Zimbabwe Ltd\ (unreported judgment No. S.C.150/87) the orthodox approach 
was adhered to. It would appear that the Magna Alloys decision was not cited to the 
Supreme Court in Davis and Others v National Foods o f Zimbabwe Ltd. (supra). It is 
interesting to note that Davis and Others v National Foods Zimbabwe Ltd. is not referred 
to in the Book case. Gubbay JA concurred in the judgment delivered by Manyarara JA in 
Davit' case, he alsoconcurrcdin Dumbulshcna CJ's judgment in the Bookcase. The volte- 
face is not explained.
53 (Supra) atp.501.
54 (Supra) at p.310.
55 (Supra).
56 The Magna Alloys hcadnole is quoted on p. 18 of the Book judgment.
Ganc’s translation, Volume 1 at p.428.
58 (Supra) at p.226.
59 Edgecombe v Hodgson (1902) (19) SA 224, at 226.
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Roman-Dutch jurists are not, it is submitted, authority for shifting the onus from 
the covenantee to the covenantor. The best that can be said of the Roman-Dutch 
authorities is that their system did not have a restraint of trade doctrine at all,60 
and that they are silent on the question of onus. It is, therefore, incorrect to refer 
to the new approach as the “Roman-Dutch” approach.61 The conclusion support­
able on a truly Roman-Dutch approach would have been that our law docs not 
have a restraint doctrine at all.
The “Roman-Dutch” law argument is linked to the second justification for 
the new approach. This is the reasoning that because Roman-Dutch law did not 
have a restraint of trade doctrine, it gave pride of place to the notion of sanctity 
of contract. The argument is that in the conflict between freedom of contract on 
the one hand, and freedom to trade on the other, English law gives precedence 
to the promotion of freedom to trade. It is by virtue of this paramountcy given 
to freedom to trade, so the argument goes, that the restraint doctrine developed 
as it did in English law. On the other hand, Roman Dutch law gives precedence 
to sanctity of contract, with freedom to trade coming a poor second. Accordingly, 
the rules relating to contracts in restraint of trade could not be the same in the two 
jurisdictions as they start from different premises. In “Roman-Dutch” law, 
because sanctity of contract is considered to be more important than freedom of 
trade, it follows that once a contract has been freely and voluntarily entered into, 
it should be enforceable unless, and until it is shown to be contrary to public 
policy —  not vice-versa. Didcott J.62 after discussing the two conflicting 
principles concludes that sanctity of contract shows itself to be: “The stronger in 
our jurisprudence than freedom of trade.” He proceeds: “It (freedom to trade) is 
intrinsically the less compelling of the two ideas as I, at any rate, sec things. 
People should keep their promises. That appeal for honour surely transcends all 
else of present relevance.” Van Rccncn J, no doubt, saw things the same way. He 
said: “The modem trend, however, is to have greater regard for such conditions 
as being conditions voluntarily agreed upon by the parties to a contract. 
Particularly under our system of law which pays great respect to the sanctity of 
contract, there is much to be said for upholding rather than repudiating them.” 
He certainly had no sympathy for the reneging covenantor. In the view of the 
learned judge: “He was quite prepared to agree to these conditions when it suited 
his advantage, but now claims he is not bound thereby.”63 *In Muparadzi v 
MangwanaM Greenland J. introduced his treatment of the issue of onus with the 
statement of principle that: “In my view, everything depends on which of two 
distinct approaches is adopted. The first approach, which may be termed the 
English approach, is concerned really with emphasising the promotion of free 
trade. The second approach, which may be termed the Roman Dutch approach,
60 Kerr op cil p.l 16.
61 The new approach, according to which the restraint of trade doctrine is part of our law, but 
the onus of proving unreasonableness is on the covenantor, has no basis in Roman-Dutch 
sources. It is more of a South African than a Roman-Dutch law approach.
62 (Supra) at pp.505-506.
63 Mado (Ply) Ltd. v Wallace (1979) (2) SA 957 (T) at 958.
M (Supra) at p.3.
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is concerned really with emphasising the sanctity of contract.” Greenland J. 
preferred the “Roman-Dutch” approach.
While it is argued that .the significance accorded the notion of sanctity in 
Roman-Dutch law necessitates the shifting of the onus (to prove unreasonable­
ness) on to the covenantor, it is noteworthy that the “sanctity” argument is never 
taken to its logical conclusion. Insofar as the restraint doctrine enables a party to 
resile, with impunity from a contract freely and voluntarily entered into on the 
grounds of unreasonableness, it is inconsistent with the high ground of sanctity 
of contract. If sanctity of contract is so important, why not jettison the restraint 
doctrine altogether? Neither in Magna Alloys and Research S.A. (Pty) Ltd. v 
Ellis65 nor in theBook case was it suggested that the restraint doctrine should be 
rejected in the interests of sanctity of contract.66 In fact, the appeal to the virtues 
of sanctity of contract is always qualified by the caveat that.sight should not be 
lost of the “freedom of trade” tenet which lies at the root of the English restraint 
doctrine. In the words of Didcott J:67
“One should not, however, overlook the impulse behind the 
English policy. It was the ideal that everyone should have the 
maximum freedom to trade and earn his livelihood when, where, 
and how he pleased which was taken seriously enough to be 
thought worthy of protection. The idea has a place in our ethos 
too.”
The learned judge further remarks:68
“The collision between these two ideas, freedom of trade and 
sanctity of contract, docs not dictate the unqualified acceptance of 
one to the total exclusion of the other.”
Dumbutshcna CJ. juxtaposed the conflicting principles pthus:69
“It is in the public interest that agreements freely entered into 
must be honoured. However, it is also in the public interest that 
anyone must, as far as possible, be able to participate in the 
business and professional world.”70
V ■
The reluctance to lake “sanctity of contract” to its logical conclusion and go 
for an out and out rejection of the restraint doctrine, and, the concomitant 
continuing conflict between freedom ofcontractand freedom of trade both raise
65 (Supra).
66 See Book v Davidson (supra) at p.5.
67 (Supra) at p.504.
68 (Supra) at p.505. Also see Magna Alloys andResearch S.A. (Ply) Ltd. v Ellis (supra) at 890.
69 At p.5.
70 This is more of a restatement of the problem than an attempt to resolve it. The learned Chief 
Justice docs not explain what factors arc put into the scales to strike the right balance.
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an important point. How significant is the change from the orthodox to the new 
approach? The recognition of the interplay between the two conflicting interests 
of public policy is certainly no new discovery. The problems posed by the 
attempt to reconcile the right to work with one’s right to bargain has been around 
for quite some time. Lord Shaw addressed it in Mason v Provident Clothing and 
Supply Co.n  So, both the English and Roman-Dutch jurisdictions have been 
attempting to reconcile the two conflicting principles. At the end of the day, the 
compromise that has been reached, according to the new approach is that a 
covenantin restraintof tradcis enforceable unless itis unreasonable. English law 
says a covenant in restraint of trade is unenforceable unless it is reasonable. It 
may well be that the difference between these two positions is no more than the 
difference between saying: “the bottle is half empty,” and, “the bottle is half 
full.”71 2 If, in the final analysis, this is in fact the ease, the importance given to 
sanctity of contract as a basis for shifting the onus of proof for the covenantee to 
the covenantor is totally unwarranted.
Furthermore, the idea thatRoman-Dutch law gives greater weight to sanctity 
of contract than docs English law (which, supposedly, gives precedence to 
freedom of trade) is, it is submitted, fallacious. The English Law position is that 
it takes sanctity of contract as the starting principle.73 However, sanctity of 
contract is not an absolute doctrine. There arc exceptions to it. The restraint of 
trade doctrine is just one of those exceptions to the general notion of sanctity. It 
should be borne in mind that restrictive conditions will be enforced, notwith­
standing the fact that they limit one’s liberty to trade as long as those conditions 
are shown to be reasonable. In Nordenfelt v Maxim Nordenfelt Guns and 
Ammunition Co. (supra) the locu classicus on the subject as far as English law 
is concerned, the Court enforced a. clause which restrained appellant from 
carrying on the trade in question anywhere in the world for a period of twenty- 
five years. Moreover, while every covenant in restraint of trade involves a 
derogation from freedom to trade, not every derogation from freedom of trade 
is under English law, a covenant in restraint of trade in the technical sense of the 
doctrine. English law distinguishes between, on the one hand, those contractual 
provisions which, whilst restricting an individual’s freedom to trade, are not 
subject to the restraint doctrine, and, on the other hand, those provisions which 
are subject to it. The importance of the distinction lies in the fact that restrictive 
conditions which fall into the former category are not subject to the reasonable­
ness test at all. The rules relating to covenants in restraint of trade arc only 
applicable to the later. Restrictive conditions fall into the former category if they 
are taken to have passed into the accepted and normal currency of commercial 
relations.74 It is, therefore, an over-simplification of the issues to try to formulate
71 (1913) AC 724 at 739.
72 Whether this is, in fact, so depends on the precise formulation of the new approach. It can 
only be from the formulation that the degree of departure from the orthodox approach can 
be gleaned.
73 Sec Printing and Numerical Registering Co. v Sampson (1875) LR 19 HQ 462, and E. 
Underwood and Son Ltd. v Barker (1899) I CII 300.
74 See the eases cited in Footnote 43 above. None of the eases adopting the new approach 
discusses this dichotomy.
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rules in terms of whether freedom to trade or sanctity of contract takes prece­
dence over the other. In both systems, freedom and sanctity of contract form the 
raison d’etre oi the law of contract.
In neither system is sanctity of contract an absolute doctrine. That is why the 
sanctity argument is not taken to its logical conclusion. In both systems, the 
notion of sanctity necessarily exists against the background, and in the context, 
of wider considerations of public policy. The full ramifications of sanctity of 
contract must be considered in the light of, and be tempered by other societal 
goals. .
The resulting rules are a product of the interaction and interplay of the various 
principles, policies and other societal goals. They cannot be dependent, solely on 
the order in which formulae appear in the hierarchy of principles and doctrines.
Even if it were to be accepted that sanctity of contract takes precedence over 
freedom to trade, it is not a necessary corollary of that stance that the onus should 
be on the covenantor to prove unreasonableness. A crucial factor in the 
determination of the question as to where the onus should lie is the factum 
probandum. This seems to have been overlooked in all the decided cases which 
follow the new approach. When it is said that the onus is on the covenantor to. 
prove that the restraint clause is unreasonable, what facts, exactly, is she/he 
expected to place before the court to establish the unreasonableness of the 
restraint? According to the orthodox approach, it was incumbent on the covenan­
tee to prove reasonableness. This she/he could do by showing that she/he had a 
legitimate interest to protect, and, that the restraint went no further than was 
reasonably necessary to protect that legitimate interest. This meant that the 
covenantee was required to prove a series of positive facts. For instance, where 
a restraint had been imposed upon an employee (or ex-employee as the case may 
be), it would be the covcnantce/cmployer who would be better placed to tell the 
court what trade secrets and/or confidential information she/he sought to protect, 
and, how the restraint went no further than was reasonably necessary to afford 
that protection. Where the extension of the covenantee’s business activities into 
new areas was in issue, it would be the covcnantec/cmployer who would be best 
placed to inform the court that the restraint extended to areas Xyz because she/ 
he intended to extend his/her business activities to areas Xyz. Accordingly, it 
made sense to place the onus on the covenantee. She/he would be required to 
prove a series of positive facts, some of which would be peculiarly within his 
knowledge.
As far as the new approach is concerned, what is it that the covenantor has 
to show to discharge the onus of proving unreasonableness? As has already been 
observed, this point is not squarely addressed in any of the decided cases. If Lhere 
is nothing more to the change in the law than just the shifting of onus, then it is 
just a matter of looking at the other side of the coin. The covenantor would have 
to show that the covenantee had no legitimate proprietary interest to protect or 
that if there is such an interest, the restraint went further than was reasonably 
necessary to protect that interest.
Z. L. Rev. Vol. 6 1 9 8 8 19
This viewpoint seems to tally with the caution with which the change in the 
law has been attended. Should this be an accurate reflection'of the new law, it is 
submitted that it is unsatisfactory as it places upon the covenantor, a burden to 
establish a series of negatives.75 Needless to say there would be cases in which 
the covenantor concerned would be able to establish the relevant negative facts. 
At the same time, it is by no means stretching the imagination too far to envisage 
a situation in which, in essence, the covenantor would be required to show that 
he acquired no trade secrets or confidential information, or, that the covenantee 
had no intention of extending his/her business activities into a new area. Because 
of the nature of the factum probandum, it is submitted that the best that a 
covenantor could do in such a case is just to aver that she/he acquired no trade 
secrets, or, that the covenantee was not, in fact, trading in aparticular area. Would 
this be sufficient to discharge the onus? If so, then we are back to the orthodox 
position. The burden would have shifted onto the covenantee to show what trade 
secrets he sought to protect and why. Alternatively, the other manner in which 
the covenantor could discharge the onus would be by laying out in an affidavit, 
all the information acquired during the period of employment, and, in the final 
paragraph/s, aver that the information, read as a whole or in part/s docs nol 
constitute a trade secret (or trade secrets) and, therefore, warrants no protection. 
The practical inconvenience that such an approach would cause makes it absurd. 
Further problems arc not hard to envisage. The covenantor could aver that she/ 
he acquired information xyz, which docs not constitute a trade secret, only for 
the covenantee to say that she/he acquired information abc as well, which is a 
trade secret. The conclusion is inescapable that, to put it mildly, it is not expedient 
to place the onus of proving unreasonableness on the covenantor, if what she/he 
is required to prove is that the covenantee had no legitimate proprietary interest 
to protect, or that even if there was such a legitimate interest, the covenant went 
further than was reasonably necessary to protect it.
On the other hand, the new approach could be interpreted in such a manner 
as to accord greater significance to the much-adulated sanctity of contract. The 
essence of sanctity is that parties are bound by their contract because they agreed 
to it. Whether or not there was any good, valid underlying reason for entering into 
that contract is irrelevant. Consequently, if the covenantor agrees to a restraint 
provision he is bound simply and precisely because he/she agreed to it. Whether 
or not the covenantee had any legi timate proprietary interest to protect is neither 
here nor there. The covenantee would, on the premise, even be entitled to., 
protection against competition per se if she/he stipulates for it.76 Besides, it could 
be said that the covenantee has paid the price for the other party’s forbearance. 
The employee’s remuneration is that much higher because she/he agreed to the 
restraint clause. The seller gels a higher price for his/her business because she/
75 Sec Ken The Onus of Proof in Restraint of Trade Cases 1979 (96) SA Law Journal p.545.
76 According to the traditional restraint doctrine, a covenantee cannot protect himself against 
competition per se. There has to be a legitimate proprietary interest to protect. It is not clear 
what the position is under the new law. In Mparadzi v Mangwana (supra), Greenland J. 
was of the view that due to the paramountcy of sanctity, a covenantee could, according to 
the new approach, protect himsclf/hcrself against competition per se. The Book case is 
silent on this point.
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he agrees not to compete with the purchaser. If the sanctity argument is taken this 
far, it would necessarily follow that the covenantor would be required to 
discharge the onus on him/her by adducing evidence of facts pertaining to him/ 
her or the public. The covenantor would establish unreasonableness by showing 
that enforcing the restraint would be unduly harsh or unfair on him, or have 
devastating consequences on the public interest. This is quite different from 
requiring him/her to prove facts pertaining to the business interests of the 
covenantee. If this is the new approach, it docs make good commonscnse to put 
the onus on the covenantor as she/he would be required to prove positive facts.
The Roman-Dutch and sanctity arguments apart the other justification for the 
change in the law is that the relevant economic conditions in England are not the 
same as those in South Africa77 and Zimbabwe. As economics is one of the bases, 
if not the basis, of the restraint doctrine; this would be a sound argument —  if 
proven. The economic analysis that went into the cases that have been decided 
to date leaves more than a little to be desired.78 79Didcott J. does a brief survey of < 
the historical development of the restraint doctrine in England. However, his 
judgment is unsatisfactory when it comes to comparing the economic conditions 
prevailing in South Africa in 1977 and those obtaining in 1894 England, or, better 
still, 1977 England. With the Zimbabwean scenario, there arc no concrete 
comparisons with England either. The adoption of the South African position 
would seem to suggest that at the very least, the economic circumstances and 
policy goals of Zimbabwe and South Africa are similar. Whether or not this was 
the court’s assumption, no statistics, facts or figures are given to support the 
economics argument. The impression that is created is that only lip-service was 
being paid thereto. It is submitted that at the end of the day the Supreme Court 
failed to sufficiently justify the shifting of the onus from the covenantee to the 
covenantor.
5. THE RELEVANT DATE FOR 
DETERMINING UNREASONABLENESS
Where the unreasonableness of a restraint is in issue, the surrounding circum­
stances arc no longer to be taken, as was the case under the orthodox approach, 
as at the time of the conclusion of the contract. Instead, the unreasonableness is 
to be determined in the light of the circumstances prevailing when the court is 
asked to enforce the restraint. This would appear to be the new position, as laid 
down in the Book case. This stance would be in line with the Supreme Court’s 
preference for the new South African approach as enunciated in Magna Alloys 
and Research S.A. (Pty)Ltd. v Ellis79 as against the orthodox approach. However,
77 Sec Roffey v Catleral, Edwards and Goudre (supra) at pp.499-501; Drewllens (Ply) Ltd. 
v Carley (supra) at pp.311-312, Book v Davidson (supra) at.p.14.
78 It is submitted that the best attempt at looking at the economics argument is by Squires J. 
in Commercial and Industrial Holdings (Pvt) Ltd. and Another v Leigh-Smith and Others 
1981 ZLR 647, at 664-665. On appeal, Georges JA said of die attempt: “The approach is 
original and also attractive and it is wilh some regret that I find myself unable to agree.” 
No reasons are given for the failure to agree, let alone those of an economic nature.
79 (Supra).
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the pronouncements of the court on this aspect of the matter have to be taken with 
a pinch of salt as they were, it is submitted, obiter. As far as the court itself was 
concerned, the sole issue for decision was the question of onus. On p.4 of the 
judgment, Dumbulshcna CJ says: “The importance of this appeal rests on the 
question of onus of proof in cases in which the enforcement of a restraint of trade 
provision contained in any assessment is in issue.” The point is reiterated on p.8 
where the learned Chief Justice says: “As already pointed out above, this appeal 
is solely concerned with the onus of proof.” In the light of these remarks, it can 
be safely said that whatever was said with regard to the relevant date for assessing 
the unreasonableness of a clause was obiter. This is borne out by the manner in 
which the preference for the new South African approach is phrased. It is put 
thus:
“Speaking for myself, I find it logical and just that the proper 
time to assess the restraint that is being challenged is at the time 
the court is asked to enforce or not to enforce the restraint. The 
court can then take into account the relevant circumstances. In 
my view, that is the time when the reasonableness of the restraint 
can properly be assessed”.80 (Emphasis is mine).
In South Africa, the inception-date rule had been rejected in National Chem- 
search SA. (Ply) Ltd. v Borrowman and Another,81 823Drewttens (Ply) Ltd. v 
Carlcf2, and Magna Alloys and Research S.A. (Ply) Ltd. v EllisP
It is most respectfully submitted that on the facts of the Book case, the 
Supreme Court erred in treating this matter as not being relevant to its decision. 
The question of onus was not the only issue at stake. The facts of the case were 
that the restraint provision that the Respondent was relying upon was contained 
in Clause 12 of the memorandum of partnership of September 1983. In May 
1984, there was the agreement in terms of which the partnership was dissolved 
and Appellant sold his half-share in the business to Respondent. Enforcement of 
the restraint was sought (in the High Court) in October 1986. The reasonableness 
or otherwise of the restraint might well have been viewed differently depending 
on which one of the three dates was chosen as the relevant date. The nature of the 
case created the real danger of it being assumed that the restraint clause was 
contained in the sale agreement of May 1984 whercundcr Appellant sold his half 
share in the business to Respondent. On this basis, the sale of the good will of the 
business would be a very strong factor weighing in favour of the finding that the 
restraint was a reasonable one. If the date of hearing had been held to be the 
relevant date, then the court would have been entitled to take into consideration 
the May 1984 salcand the circumstances surrounding it. On the other hand, if the 
inception-date rule applied, the court would not have been entitled to lake the
80 (Supra), at p.8.
81 (Supra).
82 (Supra).
83 (Supra).
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1984 sale into account. The court would have had to consider the situation as it 
was at the time when the memorandum of partnership was signed.84.
In fact, Appellant’s alternative argument was that even if the onus were on 
him to establish the unreasonableness of therestraint, it wasclcarly unreasonable 
if viewed as at the time of the conclusion of the partnership agreement in 
September 1983.85 It was implicit in this argument that if the onus were on the 
Appellant, and, further, the relevant dale for determining unreasonableness was 
the date of hearing, he (the Appellant) had no case. In the light of this argument, 
it was, therefore, necessary for the Supreme Court to decide whether the 
inception-date rule had been overruled.86
While expressing a preference for the “hearing-date” rule, it would appear 
that Dumbutshena CJ could not bring himself to abandon completely, the 
reasoning entailed by the orthodox inception-date rule. Clause 12 of the parties’ 
memorandum of partnership also provided that: “. . . The partnership hereby 
agrees that this restraint is reasonable . . .  “ The learned Chief Justice seems to 
have set much on this stipulation. After citing the above-quoted except, he 
comments: “The Appellant has not cast any doubts on the sentiments expressed 
in the restraint provision.”87 Surely, the words of the contract are an indication 
of what the party had in mind at the time of contracting. Accordingly, what the . 
covenantor thought as. to the reasonableness of the restraint at the time of 
contracting is relevant, if at all, if the surrounding circumstances arc to be 
considered as at the date of the conclusion of the contract.
In Commercial & Industrial Holdings (Pvt) Ltd. and Another v Leigh-Smith 
and Others,88 Georges JA (as he then was) declined to follow National Chem- 
search S.A. (Ply) Ltd. v Borrowman and Another*9 and Drewttens (Pty) Ltd. v 
Carley.90 He was not convinced that the decision in Aling and Streak v Oliver91 
was plainly wrong.92 Dumbutshena CJ (in his obiter dictum) prefers the hearing- 
date rule on the grounds of justice and logic. It is not clear whether, unlike 
Georges JA, he is convinced that the old law is plainly wrong. In fact, depending 
on the precise formulation of the new rule, the question as to the relevant date for 
assessing unreasonableness may well be a non-issue. According to the orthodox
84 Sec the remarks of Diplock LJ (as he then was) in Gledhow Autoparts Lid. v Delaney 
[1965] 3 ALL ER 288, at 295, (1965) 1 WLR 1366, at 1377.
85 Mr. D.A.B. Robinson who was counsel for the Appellant in this case is a colleague at the 
University of Zimbabwe’s Law Faculty. 1 had access to his record of the case — 
particularly his heads of argument.
86 The court did not proceed to the stage of applying the law to the facts. Thus, the question 
whether Appellant had discharged the onus of proving unreasonableness was not ad­
dressed.
87 At p.20.
88 (Supra).
89 (Supra).
90 (Supra). 1
91 1949(1) SA 215.
92 (Supra) on p.234 of the S.A. Law Report.
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approach, a covenant in restraint of trade is prima facie invalid. To add “and 
unenforceable” is superfluous. There can be no question of enforcing an invalid 
agreement. Once the restraint which is prima facie invalid is shown to be 
reasonable, it is valid. The dichotomy is between validity and invalidity. As long 
as one is thinking in terms of these two alternatives, the relevant date must be the 
lime of the conclusion of the contract. A contract is either valid or invalid at its 
inception.93 Under the so-called Roman-Dutch approach, a covenant in restraint 
of trade is prima facie valid, and, therefore, enforceable. But what is the 
consequence of proving the restraint to be unreasonable? This again, is a matter 
of how far the sanctity argument is to be taken. The position could be. that a 
covenant that has been shown to be unreasonable is invalid. This would be 
retaining the orthodox valid/invalid dichotomy but simply reversing the order. 
On the other hand, the new approach could be that subject to the other vitiating 
elements applicable to contracts in general, a covenant in restraint of trade is 
always valid. Proof that it is unreasonable does not render it void. The effect of 
such proof is to make this clause unenforceable at that particular point in time 
because of the impact such enforcement would have on the public interest. 
Strictly speaking, it would be erroneous to talk of the clause being "unreason­
able” in the context of this view of the law. It would be more accurate to say that 
it is the enforcement of the clause which would be unreasonable. The issue would 
then be what the consequences of enforcing the covenant would be. If this is the 
question to be addressed by the court, it becomes unnecessary to decide whether 
the surrounding circumstances should be looked at as at the date of the 
agreement, or, some other later date. Van Den Heever J 94 95favours this latter 
formulation of the new approach. She says: “The contract is always valid. The 
only inquiry is whether the court should compel compliance with a particular 
agreement or not, at a given time.” This passage is cited with apparent approval 
in Magna Alloys and Research S.A. (Ply) Ltd. v Ellis.91 While the Book case most 
certainly follows the new South African approach to the restraint of trade 
doctrine, it is not clear whether the Supreme Court adopted the former, or the 
latter formulation of the new approach. If the Van Den Heever formulation is 
what the Supreme Court decided in favour of, then it was inaccurate to say that 
the sole question for determination was that of onus. The issue was more 
fundamental than that. It went to the very root of the restraint doctrine. However, 
if the starting premise is that the Book case was solely concerned with the issue 
of onus, it follows that the position in Zimbabwe is that a covenant in restraint 
of trade which has been shown to be unreasonable is not only unenforceable, but, 
it is also invalid. On this basis, the assessment date is an issue.
93 Alt the cases decided in favour of the inception-date rule are premised on the assumption 
that the clause is either valid or invalid.
94 Sec Drewllens (Ply) Ltd. v Carley (supra) at pp.312-313. In Magna Alloys and Research 
SA. (Ply) Ltd. v Ellis (supra) at pp.891-893, the Appellate Division seems to be agreeing 
with Van Den Heever J. that an unreasonable restraint clause is not void, but only 
unen forccablc. However, the headnotc of the case reads in part: “When a party alleges that - 
he is not bound by a restrictive condition.. ..” (emphasis added). It is submitted that there
is an inconsistency. If the clause is always valid, there is no question of the covenantor not 
being bound to it. The fact that the court may decline to enforce the provision at a particular 
point in time docs not mean that the covenantor is not bound thereby.
95 (Supra).
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The distinction between a clause that is invalid, and one that is valid but 
unenforceable is not just a matter of semantics. There are at least two remedies 
that a covenantee may obtain in respect of the breach of a covenant in restraint 
of trade. She/he could either seek an interdict restraining the covenantor from 
doing what he agreed not to do, and/or damages. If an unreasonable restraining, 
clause is invalid, the covenantee would be entitled to neither an interdict, nor 
damages therefor. There is nothing to enforce. With a provision that is valid but 
unenforceable, it is submitted that it is necessary to decide what is meant by 
“unenforceable.” If what renders a covenant, unreasonable is the injury that 
would be caused to the public interest by granting an interdict in respect thereof, 
all this means that the covenant is “unenforceable” in .the sense of an interdict 
being granted. It need not necessarily follow that damages may not be awarded 
in respect thereof. If an award of damages would not be injurious to the public 
interest, it is submitted that there would be no reason why damages should not 
be awarded. Thus, if a clause is valid it may be “unenforceable” in the sense of 
granting an interdict, to compel compliance therewith, but enforceable in so far 
as the covenantee may be entitled to damages. Van Den Hcevcr J ’s formulation 
is couched in terms of: “...  whether the court should compel compliance.. This 
is redolent of ordering specific performance. An interdict is the equivalent of an 
order for specific performance in the context of covenants in restraint of trade. 
The only remedy sought in Drewttens (Ply) Ltd. v Carley96 97was an interdict. 
Similarly, the case of Cape Can (Ply) Ltd. tla Canon Western Cape v Van 
Nimwegen and Another91 did .not give Van Den Heever J. an opportunity to 
expound on the new South African approach vis-a-vis the remedy of damages. 
It too was concerned with an interdict. In any event, the covenantees succeeded 
in both cases with the result thateven if damages had been sought, it would have 
been unnecessary to consider the possibility of a restraint clause being “unen­
forceable” in the sense of granting an interdict, but, “enforceable” in the sense, 
of awarding damages therefor. It is submitted that cases in which an award of 
damages would be detrimental to the public interest would be hard to come by.
6. SEVERABILITY
Whatever was said in the Book case with regard to severance was, no doubt, 
also obiter. In the view of the court, the sole question for decision was that of 
onus. Further, severance did not arise on the facts of the case. It is', however, 
worth noting that on p.18 of the judgment, Dumbutshena CJ, quoting from the 
hcadnote of the Magna Alloys case, approved of the new “partial enforcement” 
approach. This means that where a covenant as drafted, is unreasonably wide, the 
court may enforce it to the extent that it is reasonable to do so regardless of 
whether or not the notional “blue-pencil” could be applied to the clause. A good 
example of “partial enforcement” appears in Mparadzi v Mangwana,9S in which 
the matter arose squarely for decision. There, Greenland J. reduced a five-year 
rcstraintperiod to three years arid interdicted the covenantor/rcspondent in terms 
of the parties’ contract, but, for three years instead of the stipulated five years.
96
97
98
(Supra).
1988 (2) SA 454. 
(Supra).
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Greenland J ’s judgment was confirmed on appeal." Consequently, the 
“blue-pencil” test is for us now a matter of history. The orthodox “blue-pencil” 
test was too mechanical, formalistic and illogical. Very few, if any, will lament 
its demise.
In fact, if the law is that proof of unreasonableness does not render the 
contract void, but merely unenforceable, the issue of severability also falls away. 
The question would not be the extent to which a given contract is invalid, or, 
whether certain unacceptable bits of a contract should be rejected. The matter for 
the court would be the extent to which it is prepared to enforce the agreement. 
This is not unique to covenants in restraint of trade. Where specific performance 
of a contract is concerned, the court always has a discretion with regard to the 
order it will make. The “partial enforcement” of a covenant in restraint of trade 
falls fairly and squarely within the ambit of that discretion. Indeed, the sooner the 
phrase “partial enforcement” is not raised to the status of a doctrine the better. 
The phrase means no more than that the court need not grant an order exactly as 
prayed.
25 •
7. MAY THE ANACHRONISTIC REST IN PEACE
The rejection of the orthodox English version of the restraint doctrine, and 
the adoption of the new South African approach poses two questions:
1. what is left of the restraint doctrine: and
2. should anything be left of it?
Thc.issues germane to the first question have already been canvassed. What 
is left of the restraint doctrine is, in the first instance, a matter of the precise 
formulation of the new rule. In the second, much depends on what the covenantor 
now has to establish to sustain his/her prayer that the covenant be not enforced. 
What constitutes an “unreasonable” impact on the public interest? What degree 
of damage to the public interest would warrant a denial of enforcement? It must 
be borne in mind that the court may, in a proper case, refuse to grant a decrec of 
specific performance.* 100
Since an interdict is the equivalent of an order of specific performance, some 
restrictive conditions might fall under this general rule, as distinct from the 
special rule applicable to covenants in rcstraintof trade. The question would then 
be whether the basis on which a decree of specific performance may be denied, 
as a general rule, is different from the “unreasonableness” or “detriment to publ ic 
interest” criterion under the restraint doctrine. If the criteria are the same; the 
restraint doctrine has become a superfluity. It is submitted that there is no need 
for a separate and different standard under the restraint doctrine. If there is to be 
any substance to the pride of place accorded to sanctity of contract, the law must
"  Sec Mangwana v Mparadzi unreported judgment No. S.C.5/89.
100 See Farmer's Co-operative Society v Berry (1912) AD 343, and Haynes v Kingwilliam- 
stown Municipality 1951 (2) SA 170.
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be that the court will refuse to enforce a restraint provision only in circumstances 
where the consequences of such enforcement would be really drastic. They must 
be so drastic that in any event, the court would have exercised its discretion not 
to enforce the provision in terms of its general discretion. This would obviate the 
need for a special rule per restraint of trade doctrine. In all the decided cases, to 
date, in which the new approach has been applied, the covenantee succeeded. 
The result is that the courts arc yet to give an indication as to what sort of 
circumstances would justify the conclusion that a covenant should not, in the 
circumstances of the case, be enforced.
In the final analysis, the decision in the Book case leaves the law in a more 
unsatisfactory state than it was in before. The law has been changed. That much 
is clear. But, because of the focus on the issue of onus, and the scant regard paid 
to the underlying rules, it is not clear to what extent the orthodox approach has 
been replaced by the new. As the restraint doctrine itself was not rejected in 
terms, it is still part of our law. Further, support for this proposition is to be found 
in the subsequent Supreme Court decision in Mangwana v Mparadzi (supra). 
What has changed is where die onus lies. Apart from that, there arc many loose 
ends still to be tied. It is submitted that if the Supreme Court was satisfied that 
there was merit in the restraint doctrine, it should have retained the orthodox 
approach. On the other hand, if it deemed it fit to change the law qn the point, it 
should have jettisoned the doctrine altogether. The restraint of trade doctrine ill- 
comports with sanctity of contract. Besides, it serves no useful purpose.
The basis of the restraint of trade doctrine has tended to change from time to 
time. In medieval times, the doctrine was justified on the grounds that a covenant 
in restraint of trade impinged on the individual’s liberty as embodied in the 
Magna Carta. In Elizabethan England, it served to prevent the creation of 
monopolies.101
In Nordenfelt v Maxim Nordenfelt Guns and Ammunition Co. (supra) Lord 
McNaughten saw the rationale of the doctrine as being that “The public have an 
interest in every person’s carrying on his trade freely, so has the individual.” In 
terms of this justification, the doctrine is intended to protect the restrained 
individual himself, and the public in so far as ithasan interest in that individual’s 
ability to carry on his trade as he pleases. This, it would seem, is the accepted 
rationale in Zimbabwe today.102
As far as the protection of the individual’s own interest is concerned, the 
restraint doctrine is totally unwarranted. The individual is free to work as he 
pleases. To be able to bargain away part of that freedom is, it is submitted, a facet 
of his/her enjoyment of that freedom. In seeking to protect the would-be 
covenantor, the law is adopting a paternalistic approach which is quite uncalled 
for. If a party is restrained from engaging in one line of business he/shc can
101 For the historical development of the restraint of trade doctrine in Anglo-American juris­
prudence, see Ileydon, The Restraint o f Trade Doctrine, Butlenvorlhs, Ixindon, (1971), 
pp. 1-37 and, Harlan M. Black, “Employee Agreements not to Compete” 1959 (6) Harvard 
Law Review.
Sec Book v Davidson (supra), p.5.101
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always engage in another. As the law’s concession to paternalism, the protection 
of the poor, pathetic individual against his/her own folly, the restraint doctrine 
is both inadequate and inappropriate. There is no reasonable justification for 
being paternalistic with regard to covenants in restraint of trade whilst adopting 
a hands-off non-interventionist attitude with regard to contractual provisions in 
general. Consequently, the restraint of trade doctrine is too narrow as regards the 
class of contractual terms to which itapplies. Worse still, it docs not even purport 
to serve the weakest members of society who are most in need of the paternalistic 
protection of the law. Illiterate persons who sign documents the contents of 
which they do not appreciate arc bound by virtue of the caveat subscriptor rule, 
their illiteracy notwithstanding. In its fidelity to classical liberal conceptions of 
formal freedom of choice, the law does not regard inequality of bargaining 
power, or any other form of economic pressure, as a good enough reason for not 
abiding by the terms of one’s contract. The paternalism and/or interventionism 
of the restraint of trade doctrine is, therefore, rather incongrous. It is hard to 
justify. This is even more so in the light of the fact that by and large, the party 
who is likely to benefit from the restraint doctrine is the type of person (natural 
or juristic) who should be better-equipped to manage his/her own affairs. To lake 
a brief survey of the Zimbabwean decided cases, in Spa Food Products v Sarif03 
the Rcspondcnl/covcnantor was another manufacturer of cordials, minerals and 
other aerated waters. In H.E. Sergay Estates v Romano104 the covenantor had 
been employed as an assistant in an estate agency business. In Rhodesian Milling 
Co. (Pvt) Ltd. v Super Bakery (Pvt) Ltd„105 Biografic (Pvt) Ltd. v Wilson,106 
Commercial & Industrial Holdings (Pvt) Ltd. and Another v Leigh-Smith and 
Others1™ and, ihcBook case itself, the parties seeking to avoid their contractual 
obligations were all persons engaged in apparently thriving business ventures. 
It could hardly be argued that any of the covenantors involved in these disputes 
was the paradigm case of the weak, pathetic, exploited individual desperately in 
need of the paternalistic protection of the law.
Courts have tended to regard restraints imposed on employees (and ex-em­
ployees) with greater disfavour than other covenants. This attitude is premised 
on the assumption that the would-be employee is always in a weaker bargaining 
position when compared to the prospective employer, with the result that the 
latter would be in a position to dictate unfair terms which would otherwise be 
unacceptable to the former.108 This argument would seem to represent the 
strongest case for the retention of the restraint of trade doctrine. However, it is 
submitted that even the cmployer/cmploycc relationship does not justify the 
existence of the restraint of trade doctrine, less still its retention. It could hardly
103
101
105
106
107
108
(Supra).
(Supra).
(Supra).
(Supra).
(Supra).
Sec Per Lord Artkinson in Herbert Morris Ltd. v Saxelby 1916 (1) AC 688 (HL), at 701, 
Rojfey v Catterall Edwards and Goudre at pp.494-495, Commercial and Industrial 
Holdings (Pvt) Ltd. and Another v Leigh-Smith and Others (supra) p.235 S.A. Law Report, 
and Harlan M. Black op cit.
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be gainsaid that the phenomenon of inequality of bargaining power is by no 
means unique to employment contracts. Accordingly, any rule of law intended 
to remedy the iniquities of inequality of bargaining power would have to be a 
general one, applicable not only to the employment contract but to any other 
contact as well. The position at the moment is that the court is prepared to 
consider the reality of inequality of bargaining power as far as the covenant in 
restraint of trade is concerned, but not in respect of any other term or condition 
of that contract. As the chances are that an employer with superior bargaining 
power would exert it with generous liberality, the only justification for placing 
restrictive conditions on a different footing would be that if enforced, their impact 
would be far more drastic than that of any other unfair term. This argument loses 
its weight if due regard is had to the class of employee likely to be restrained. It 
is submitted that an employer is not likely to impose covenants in restraint.of 
trade willy-nilly on unskilled general labourers and semi-skilled workers. No 
purpose would be served by it. The economic costs.of drafting all the elaborate 
provisions could not be worth it. The employee who is likely to be restrained is 
one who would be relatively high up in the hierarchy of an organisation, high 
enough to have access to confidential information and trade secrets. The nearer 
an employee is to the echelons of power in an organisation, the more she/he is 
likely to be restrained, and, the less paternalistic protection she/he needs. The 
eventuating situation is an interesting paradox: the more an employee is likely to 
have a covenant in restraint of trade imposed on him/her, the less paternalistic 
protection that employee needs the more an employee is in need of paternalistic 
protection, the less that employee is likely to be a covenantor.
In A. Schroeder Music Publishing Co. v Macaulay, Lord Diplock based the 
restraint doctrine fairly and squarely on the iniquities of inequality of bargaining 
power. He observed that:
“What your Lordships have been doing is to assess the relative 
bargaining power of the publisher and the song-writer at the time 
the contract was made and to decide whether the publisher had 
used his superior bargaining power to exact from the song-writer 
promises that were unfairly onerous to him. Your Lordships have 
not been concerned to inquire whether the public have in fact 
been deprived of the fruits of the song-writer’s talents by reason 
of restrictions, nor to assess the likelihood that they would be so 
deprived in the future if the contract were permitted, to run its full 
course. It is in my view salutary to acknowledge that in refusing 
to enforce provisions of a contract whereby one parly agrees, for 
the benefit of the other party, to exploit, or refrain from exploit­
ing, his own earning power, the public policy which the court is 
implementing is not some nineteenth century economic theory 
about the benefit of the general public of freedom of trade, but the 
protection of those whose bargaining power is weak against being 
forced by those whose bargaining power is strong, to enter into 
bargains that are unconscionable.”109
109 A. Schroeder Music Publishing Co. v Macaulay (supra) at p.623.
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The rejection of the fallacy of freedom of contract implicit in Lord Diplock’s 
remark, is, commendable. It would be more commendable if this rationale for 
refusing to enforce covenants in restraint of trade were applied to contracts in 
general. This is the stance the Supreme Court should have taken— to jettison the 
restraint of trade doctrine altogether and, in its place, substitute a general 
unconscionability doctrine.
Traditionally, the restraint of trade doctrine is, as appears from the foregoing, 
based on public policy, or, the public interest. “The public interest” is a phrase 
of many meanings. The phrase could be used to mean "inter alia” the general 
morale and well-being of society. The reasoning arising from this interpretation 
of “the public interest” is that it is immoral to restrict an individual’s liberty to 
trade. To this proposition, one may well reply with Van Den Hecver J.’s words:
“To accept that an unreasonable restraint of trade may be invalid 
as being immoral appears to be attempting to dress Elizabeth 
Taylor in the clothes of a Justinian actress.”110 1.
More often than not, “public interest” is used in the economic sense. In its 
turn, this variant of “the public interest” had three facets to it. Firstly, it is said 
that the community, be it as an entity in itself or as an aggregation of individuals, 
benefits from the individual’s exploitation of his skills and expertise. If each and 
every individual retains and exercises the freedom to do what they are best at, this 
promotes the societal goal of wealth-maximisation. A covenant in restraint of 
trade, which would have the effect of debarring the covenantor from doing what 
she/he is best at, would derogate from the goal of wealth maximisation. 
Accordingly, a restraint clause would be contrary to the public interest — hence 
the restraint of trade doctrine. The second facet, which is not totally unrelated to 
the first, is that if the individual is allowed,to work as hc/she chooses, he/shc 
would, depending on the nature of the trade of course, create employment thus 
benefiting other members of the community directly. Both aspects, of the 
economics argument.were relied upon by Squires J. (in the High Court) in 
Commercial and Industrial Holdings (Pvt) Ltd. and Another v Leigh-Smith and 
Others?11 The learned judge said:
“The country faces a severe, if not an acute shortage of skills; a 
shortage that grows each month. The Respondents have very 
considerable skills, and, moreover, those skills can generate 
employment for others and themselves and wealth in commensu­
rable quantities. The evidence is that these skills can, and in fact 
arc contributory to the country’s exports. It seems to be manifest 
that at the present time, the public interest is better served by 
having more skilled people working than less, more economic 
activity being generated than less, and more foreign currency 
being earned than less.”
110 Drewttens Proprietary Ltd. v Carley (supra) at 213.
111 1981 ZLR 647, at pp.664-5.
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The idea that if a person is prohibited from pursuing one trade, society is 
deprived of the benefit of his/her skills is defective in that it overlooks the fact 
that a bar in one field releases the covenantor’s potential for deployment in other 
fields. There is no guarantee that the trade in which the covenantor would be 
involved in were it not for the covenant is necessarily the one she/he is best at. 
As regards the generation of employment, foreign currency and other economic 
benefits, it is unfortunate that Squires J. docs not produce facts and figures to 
support his conclusion. He refers to “evidence” on which there is no elaboration. 
How many more jobs would the Leigh-Smith’s enterprise create? How many 
more US dollars would it generate? Looking at it from a purely theoretical 
standpoint, the involvement of more competitors in a particular trade does not 
guarantee an increased market. The result could be that the market is shared, and 
no more foreign currency is generated than would have been earned had the 
covenantor not been allowed to compete.
The same holds for employment. If the market for a commodity remains 
static the demand for the labour utilised in the production of the commodity is 
not likely to rise. Competition in such circumstances could well lead to cost­
cutting restructuring measures, some of which may entail a reduction of labour 
costs by retrenching, and, at the same time, increasing the productivity of the 
employees left behind. Furthermore, thebigger a business grows, the greater the 
need for efficient division of labour.112 Such division of labour is likely to create 
more employment. However, employers would be reluctant to maximise such 
division of labour and imparl confidential information to more employees if the 
law did not provide a safeguard against the-subsequent use of such information 
in competition against one. If there were no such safeguard the tendency would 
be to restrict severely the number of employees entrusted with confidential in­
formation and trade secrets. The law provides the safeguard through, inter alia, 
the instrument of contract — the employer can stipulate for his own protection. 
The restraint doctrine militates against it. It is feared that if employers arc given 
carte blanche to use the instrument of contract, they will resort to it, not only to 
facilitatcthecfficicntfunctioningof theirbusincss, but todcstroy all competition 
thereby creating monopolies. By placing limitations On the extent to which 
freedom of contract may be taken, the restraint of trade doctrine prevents the 
creation of monopolies. This is a sound contention —  as long as it is not 
overstated. Privity of contract is such that the only persons who arc debarred, by 
virtue of a restraint clause, from competing with the employer are those who have 
contracted with him/her. Every other Tom, Dick or Harriet arc free to compete 
as they arc notconlraclually bound not to do so. Moreover, covenants in restraint 
of trade arc not the most effective mechanism for the creation of monopolies. 
There arc better ways of doing it — such as price undercutting or buying out 
one’s most powerful competitors.
The common law restraint doctrine is not the best method of combating 
monopolies either. The restraint doctrine relics on litigation and the judicial
112 Harlan M Black op cit pp.650—651.
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process for its effect. The nature of the judicial process is such that judges do not 
go out of their way to look for, and probe into, suspect agreements. They wait for 
the lottery of litigation to bring them the isolated case. There is no relationship 
whatsoever between the cases that arc brought before the courts and the 
importance, in economic terms, of the disputed agreements. It may well be that 
some of the cases that are litigated have a negligible effect on the state of the 
economy, while those agreements most injurious to the public arc not litigated 
at all. The result is that the doctrine is not serving its purpose. If the prevention 
of monopolies, the promotion of competition and employment, and the encour­
agement of foreign-currency-eaming enterprises are the societal goals to be 
pursued, it is mostrespectfully submitted that lawyers and judges are not the best 
judges in these matters. Further, the judicial process is not the best mechanism 
for promoting these goals. Consequently, the common law restraint of trade 
doctrine which depends on lawyers and judges and litigation for its impactis not 
serving its purpose insofar as the regulation of the economy is concerned. It 
should therefore be done away with.
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